[1] National Institute Standards and Technology(NIST). Guidelines for smart grid cyber security: Vol. 1,smart grid cyber security strategy,architecture,and high-level requirements:NISTIR 7628 [S].U.S.A.:Department of Commerce Gary Locke,Secretary,August 2010.
[2] 中国信息物理系统发展论坛. 信息物理系统白皮书 [EB/OL]. (2017-03-01) [2020-08-03]. http://www.cesi.ac.cn/201703/2251.html. httpss://www.innovation4.cn/library/r14012

China Cyber-physical System Development Forum. Cyber-Physical System White Paper [EB/OL]. (2017-03-01) [2020-08-03]. httpss://www.innovation4.cn/library/r14012. httpss://www.innovation4.cn/library/r14012
[3] 高昆仑,辛耀中,李钊,等. 智能电网调度控制系统安全防护技术及发展 [J]. 电力系统自动化,2015,39(1):48-52.

GAOK L,XINY Z,LIZ,et al. Development and process of cybersecurity protection architecture for smart grid dispatching and control systems [J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems,2015,39(1):48-52.
[4] United States Government Accountability Office. Critical infrastructure protection:actions needed to address significant cybersecurity risks facing the electric grid. [EB/OL]. (2019-08-26)[2020-08-03]. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-332.
[5] 汤奕,陈倩,李梦雅,等. 电力信息物理融合系统环境中的网络攻击研究综述 [J]. 电力系统自动化,2016,40(17):59-69.

TANGY,CHENQ,LIM Y,et al. Overview on cyber-attacks against cyber physical power system [J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems,2016,40(17),59-69.
[6] HOLLOWAYM. Stuxnet worm attack on Iranian nuclear facilities [EB/OL]. (2015-07-16)[2020-08-03].http://large. stanford. edu/courses/2015/ph241/holloway1/.
[7] Cyber-attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Industrial control systems cyber Emergency response team(ICS-CERT) [EB/OL].(2016-02-25) [2020-08-03]. https://www.us-cert.gov/ ics/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01.
[8] VAZ R. Venezuela suffers major power outages after alleged cyber attack [EB/OL].(2019-03-10)[2020-08-03].https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14 374.
[9] WRITERS. City power hit by ransomware attack [EB/OL]. (2019-07-25)[2020-08-03]. https://www.itweb.co.za/content/GxwQDq1AnVWqlPVo.
[10] Cyber Security Intelligence. Cyber attack on a nuclear power plant [EB/OL]. (2019-11-08)[2020-08-03]. https://www.cybersecuri tyintelligence.com/blog/cyber-attack-on-a-nuclear-power-plant-4616.html.
[11] DENGR L,ZHUANGP,LIANGH. CCPA:coordinated cyber-physical attacks and countermeasures in Smart Grid [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2017,8(5):2420-2430.
[12] HUG G. GIAMPAPA J A. Vulnerability assessment of ac state estimation with respect to false data injection cyber-attacks [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2012,3(3):1362-1370.
[13] HENDRICKXJ M,JOHANSSONH K,JUNGERSR M. Efficient computations of a security index for false data attacks in power networks [J]. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,2014,59(12):3194-3208.
[14] TIANJ,TANR,GUANX H,et al. Enhanced hidden moving target defense in smart grids [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2019,10(2):2208-2223.
[15] STAGGSJ,FERLEMANND,SHENOIS. Wind farm security:attack surface,targets,scenarios and mitigation [J]. International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection,2017,17(1):3-14.
[16] National Institute Standards and Technology(NIST). Framework for improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity: NIST.CSWP.04162018 [S]. U.S. Department of Commerce: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2014.
[17] 中华人民共和国国家经济贸易委员会.电网与电厂计算机监控系统及调度数据网络安全防护规定: 中华人民共和国国家经济贸易委员会令第30号 [S]. 北京: 国家经济贸易委员会, 2003.

State Economic and Trade Commission,PRC. Regulations on security protection of computer monitoring system and dispatching data network of power grid and power plant:order No. 30 of the State Economic and Trade Commission of the People's Republic of China [S]. Beijing:State Economic and Trade Commission,2003.
[18] 中国人民共和国国家电力监管委员会. 电力二次系统安全防护规定: 监管委员会令第5号 [S]. 北京: 国家电力监管委员会, 2004.

State Electricity Regulatory Commission,RPC. Safety protection regulations for power secondary systems:order No. 5 of the State Electricity Regulatory Commission [S]. Beijing:State Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2004.
[19] 中国人民共和国国家电力监管委员会. 电力行业信息系统安全等级保护基本要求:电监信息第62号 [S]. 北京:国家电力监管委员会,2012.

State Electricity Regulatory Commission,RPC. Power industry information system security level protection basic requirements:Electricity Supervision Information No. 62 [S]. Beijing:State Electricity Regulatory Commission,2012.
[20] 中华人民共和国国家发展和改革委员. 电力监控系统安全防护规定: 中华人民共和国国家发展和改革委员会令第14号 [J]. 北京: 国家发改委,2014.

National Development and Reform Commission(NDRC). Safety protection regulation for power monitoring system:Order No. 14 of the national development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China [J].Beijing:NDRC,2014.
[21] 全国人民代表大会常务委员会.中华人民共和国网络安全法:中华人民共和国主席令第53号 [S]. 北京:全国人民代表大会常务委员会,2017.

Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. People's Republic of China cyber security law:order no. 53 of the President of the People's Republic of China [S]. Beijing:Standing Committee of the National People's Congress,2017.
[22] 中国国家标准化管理委员会.信息安全技术网络安全等级保护基本要求:GB/T 22239—2019 [S]. 北京:国家市场监督管理总局、中国国家标准化管理委员会,2019.

AdministrationStandardization. Information security technology —baseline for classified protection of cybersecurity:GB/T 22239—2019 [S]. Beijing:State Administration for Market Regulation and Standardization Administration,2019.
[23] 丁伟,唐洁瑶,曹扬,等.电网信息物理系统网络安全风险分析与防护对策[J].电力信息与通信技术,2018,16(9):33-38.

DINGW,TANGJ Y,CAOY,et al. Network security risk analysis and protective countermeasures for power grid cyber physical system [J]. Electric Power Information and Communication Technology,2018,16(9):33-38.
[24] 郭创新,陆海波,俞斌,等. 电力二次系统安全风险评估研究综述 [J]. 电网技术,2013,37(1):112-118.

GUOC X,LUH B,YUB,et al. A survey of research on security risk assessment of secondary system [J]. Power System Technology,2013,37(1):112-118.
[25] 汤奕,韩啸,吴英俊,等. 考虑通信系统影响的电力系统综合脆弱性评估 [J]. 中国电机工程学报,2015,35(23):6066-6074.

TANGY,HANX,WUY J,et al. Electric power system vulnerability assessment considering the influence of communication system [J]. Proceedings of the CSEE,2015,35(23):6066-6074.
[26] 刘念,张建华,段斌,等. 网络环境下变电站自动化通信系统脆弱性评估 [J]. 电力系统自动化,2008,32(8):28-33.

LIUN,ZHANGJ H,DUANB,et al. Vulnerability assessment for communication system of network-based substation automation system [J]. Automatiojkkjttn of Electric Power System,2008,32(8):28-33.
[27] LIUN,ZHANGJ H,ZHANGH,et al. Vulnerability assessment for communication network of substation automation systems to cyber attack [C]// Anon.2009 IEEE/PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition,Seattle,WA,USA,March 15-18,2009. Seattle:IEEE,2009:1-7.
[28] LIUN,ZHANGJ H,ZHANGH,et al. Security assessment for communication networks of power control systems using attack graph and MCDM [J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery,2010, 25(3):1492-1500.
[29] LEON DC D and ALVES-FOSSJ. Modeling complex control systems to identify remotely accessible devices vulnerable to cyber attack [EB/OL]. (2002-11)[2020-08-03] https://www.semanticscholar. org/paper/Modeling-Complex-Control-Systems-to-Identify-to-Leon-Alves-Foss/2195d5c557771c2a05b482a4d020048aab2824fb.
[30] PIETRE-CAMBACEDESL,DEFLESSELLEY,BOUISSOUM. Security modeling with BDMP:from theory to implementation [C]// Anon.2011 Conference on Network and Information Systems Security, La Rochelle,France,May 18-21 2011. La Rochelle:IEEE,2011:1-8.
[31] SOMMESTADT,EKSTEDTM,JOHNSONP. Combining defense graphs and enterprise architecture models for security analysis[C]// Anon.2008 12th International IEEE Enterprise Distributed Object Computing Conference,Munich,Germany,September 15-19,2008. Munich:IEEE,2008:1-7.
[32] SOMMESTADT,EKSTEDTM,NORDSTROML. Modeling security of power communication systems using defense graphs and influence diagrams [J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery,2009, 24(4):1801-1808.
[33] MCQUEENM.A,BOYERW F,FLYNNM A,et al. Time-to-compromise model for cyber risk reduction estimation. In: Quality of Protection. Advances in Information Security [M]. USA, MA,Boston:Springer,2006.
[34] ZHANGY C,WANGL F,XIANGY M,et al. Inclusion of SCADA cyber vulnerability in power system reliability assessment considering optimal resources allocation [J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,2106,31(6):4379-4394.
[35] ZHANGY C,XIANGY M,WANGL F. Reliability analysis of power grids with cyber vulnerability in SCADA system [C]// Anon.2014 IEEE PES General Meeting,National Harbor,MD,USA,July 27-31, 2014. National Harbor:IEEE,2014:1-5.
[36] ZHANGY C,WANGL F,XIANGY M,et al. Power system reliability evaluation with SCADA cybersecurity considerations [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2015,6(4):1707-1721.
[37] ZHANGY C,WANGL F,XIANGY M. Power system reliability analysis with intrusion tolerance in SCADA systems [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2016,7(2):669-683.
[38] NAZIRS,PATELS,PATELD. Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security:A survey of techniques [J]. Computers & Security,70(1):436-454.
[39] HEMINGWAYG,NEEMAH,NINEH,et al. Rapid synthesis of HLA-based heterogeneous simulation:a model-based integration approach [J]. Journal Simulation,88(2):217-232.
[40] QUEIROZC,MAHMOODA,TARIZ. SCADASim – a framework for building SCADA simulations [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2(4):589-597.
[41] Office of Electricity,Department of Energy(DOE). I national SCADA test bed [EB/OL].(2009-09-16) [2020-08-03]. https://www.energy.gov/oe/technology-development/energy-delivery-ystems-cybersecurity/ national-scada-test-bed.
[42] AHRENHOLZJ,DANILOVC,HENDERSONT R,et al. CORE:a real-time network emulator [C]// Anon.MILCOM 2008 - 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference,San Diego,CA,USA,November 16-19,2008. San Diego:IEEE,2009:1-7.
[43] DZUNGD,NAEDELEM,HOFFT P V,et al. Security for Industrial communication systems [J]. Proceedings of the IEEE,2005,93(6):1152-1177.
[44] SRIDHARS,HAHNA,GOVINDARASUM. Cyber-physical system security for the electric power grid [J]. Proceedings of the IEEE,2012,100(1):210-224.
[45] 刘烃,田决,王稼舟,等. 信息物理融合系统综合安全威胁与防御研究 [J]. 自动化学报,2019,45(1):5-24.

LIUT,TIANJ, WANGJ Z,et al. Integrated security threats and defense of cyber-physical systems [J]. ACTA Automatica Sinica,2019,45(1):5-24.
[46] CIANCAMERLAE,MINICHINOM,PALMIERIS. Modeling cyber attacks on a critical infrastructure scenario [C]// Anon.IISA 2013, Piraeus, Greece,July 10-12,2013. Piraeus:IEEE ,2013:1-6.
[47] LIUS C,LIUX P P,SADDIKA E. Denial-of-Service (dos) attacks on load frequency control in smart grids [C]// Anon.2013 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT),Washington,DC,USA,February 24-27,2013. Washington:IEEE,2013:1-6.
[48] SARGOLZAEIA,YEN K,ABDELGHANIM N. Delayed inputs attack on load frequency control in smart grid [C]// Anon.ISGT 2014,Washington,DC,USA,February 19-22,2014. Washington:IEEE,2014:1-5.
[49] KIM J and TONGL. On topology attack of a smart grid: undetectable attacks and countermeasures [J]. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,2013,31(7):1294-1305.
[50] LIUY,NINGP,REITERM K. False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids [J]. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security,2011,1(13):13:1-13:33.
[51] DENGR L,ZHUANGP,LIANGH. CCPA:coordinated cyber-physical attacks and countermeasures in Smart Grid [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2017,8(5):2420-2430.
[52] LIZ Y,SHAHIDEHPOURM,ALABDULWAHABA,et al. Bilevel model for analyzing coordinated cyber-physical attacks on power systems [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2016,7(5):2260-2272.
[53] 吴文可,文福拴,薛禹胜,等. 基于多源信息的延时约束加权模糊Petri网故障诊断模型 [J]. 电力系统自动化,2013,37(24):43-53.

WUW K,WENF S,XUEY S,et al. A weighted fuzzy petri net based model with time-delay constraints for power system fault diagnosis employing information from multiple sources [J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems,2013,37(24):43-53.
[54] 叶丹丹,吴维敏,苏宏业.标签Petri网的路径信息在故障诊断中的应用 [J/OL].控制与决策.Doi: 10.13195/j.kzyjc.2019.0698.

YED D,WUW M,SUH Y. Application of path information of labeled petri nets in fault diagnosis [J/OL]. Control and Decision. Doi: 10.13195/j.kzyjc.2019.0698.
[55] TEN C W, LIUC C, MANIMARANG. Vulnerability assessment of cybersecurity for SCADA systems [J].IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2008,23(4):1836-1846.
[56] TEN C W,HONGJ H,LIUC C. Anomaly detection for cybersecurity of the substations [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2011,2(4):865-873.
[57] TEN C W,YAMASHITAK,YANGZ Y,et al. Impact assessment of hypothesized cyberattacks on interconnected bulk power systems [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2018,9(5):4405-4425.
[58] TEN C W,GINTERA,BULBULR. Cyber-based contingency analysis [J]. IEEE Transactions on Power systems,2016,31(4):3040-3050.
[59] YANGZ Y,TEN C W,GINTERA. Extended enumeration of hypothesized substations outages incorporating overload implication [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2018,9(6):6929-6938.
[60] ADHIKARIU,MORRIST,PANS Y. WAMS cyber-physical test bed for power system,cybersecurity study,and data mining [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2017,8(6):2744-2753.
[61] SRIVASTAVAA,MORRIST,ERNSTERT,et al. Modeling cyber-physical vulnerability of the smart grid with incomplete information [J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2013,4(1):235-244.
[62] 吴亦贝,李俊娥,陈汹,等. 大规模可控负荷被恶意控制场景下配电网风险分析 [J]. 电力系统自动化,2018,42(10):30-37.

WUY B,LIJ E,CHENX,et al. Risk analysis of distribution network with large-scale controllable loads with attacks [J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems,2018,42(10):30-37.
[63] GRILOA M,CHENJ M,DÍAZM,et al. An integrated WSAN and SCADA system for monitoring a critical infrastructure [J]. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics,2014,10(3):1755-1764.
[64] CAZORLAL,ALCARAZC,LOPEZJ. Cyber stealth attacks in critical information infrastructures [J]. IEEE Systems Journal,2018,12(2):1778–1792.
[65] ASHOKA,HAHNA,GOVINDARASUM. Cyber-physical security of wide-area monitoring,protection and control in a smart grid environment [J]. Journal of Advanced Research,2014,5(1):481-489.
[66] ASHOKA,GOVINDARASUM,WANGJ H,et al. Cyber-physical attack-resilient wide-area monitoring,protection,and control for the power grid [J]. Proceedings of the IEEE,2017,105(7):1389-1407.
[67] 赵俊华,文福拴,薛禹胜,等. 电力信息物理融合系统的建模分析与控制研究框架 [J]. 电力系统自动化,2011,35(16):1-8.

ZHAOJ H,WENF S,XUEY S,et al. Modeling analysis and control research framework of cyber physical power systems [J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems,2011,35(16):1-8.
[68] 管晓宏,赵千川,贾庆山,等. 信息物理融合能源系统 [M]. 北京:科学出版社,2016.

GUANX H,ZHAOQ C,JIAQ S,et al. Cyber-physical energy system [M]. Beijing:Science Press,2016.
[69] LINK,HOLBERTK E. PRA for vulnerability assessment of power system infrastructure security [C]// Anon.Proceedings of the 37th Annual North American Power Symposium,Ames,IA,USA,October 25,2005. Ames:IEEE,2005:43-51.
[70] 胡炎,谢小荣,辛耀中. 电力信息系统建模和定量安全评估 [J]. 电力系统自动化,2005,29(10):30-35.

HUY,XIEX R,XINY Z. Modeling and quantitative security evaluation for electric power information systems [J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems,2005,29(10):30-35.
[71] 郭创新,俞斌,郭嘉,等. 基于IEC 61850的变电站自动化系统安全风险评估 [J]. 中国电机工程学报,2014,34(4):685-694.

GUOC X,YUB,GUOJ,et al. Security risk assessment of the IEC 61850-based substation automation system [J]. Proceedings of the CSEE,2014,34(4):685-694.
[72] MELANDP H,TONDELI A,SOLHAUGB. Mitigating risk with cyberinsurance [J]. IEEE Security & Privacy,2015,13(6):38-43.
[73] YANGZ Y. Cyber-based contingency analysis and insurance implications of power grid [D]. Houghton:Michigan Technological University,2018.
[74] YANGZ Y,LIUY,CAMPBELLM,et al. Premium calculation for insurance businesses based on cyber risks in IP-based power substations [J]. IEEE Access,in press.
[75] MRABETZ E,KAABOUCHN,GHAZIH E,et al. Cyber-security in smart grid:survey and challenges [J]. Computers & Electrical Engineering,2018,67(1):469-482.
[76] HOLMH,FLORESW R,ERICSSONG. Cyber security for a smart grid-what about phishing? [C]// Anon.IEEE PES ISGT Europe 2013, Lyngby,Denmark,October 6-9,2013. Lyngby:IEEE,2014:1-5.
[77] KNAPPE D, SAMANIR. Applied cyber security and the smart grid:implementing security controls into the modern power infrastructure [M]. Amsterdam:Elsevier,Syngress,2013.
[78] ALOULF,ALALIA R,ALDALKYR,et al. Smart grid security:threats,vulnerabilities and solutions [J]. International Journal of Smart Grid and Clean Energy,2012,1(1):1-6.